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I hope to persuade you of the following:
• Tradable emission permits and emission taxes –
“market mechanisms” – have big advantages
over other policies for controlling environmental
damage of some kinds.
• With each mechanism, the type that’s politically
most acceptable to powerful interest groups (the
“rock”) is at an opposite extreme to the type
which gives most economic welfare to society
as a whole (the “hard place”).
•  To make permits balanced, that is:
– (just) politically acceptable, and yet also
– yielding “good” improvements in economic
welfare,
it is vital to choose neither the rock nor the hard
place, by giving away some but not all permits
free to those who currently benefit from emissions.
•  To make a tax both politically acceptable and
yield good economic welfare, it is vital to give away
thresholds to exempt some but not all
emissions from taxes.
Main application here is control of
greenhouse gases, especially CO2 from
fossil fuel burning in rich countries like
Australia/NZ…
...but also relevant to politics vs
economics of other emissions control
(e.g. SO2), and to raising commodity
prices to reflect scarcity, e.g. for water
However, first set out simplest idea of
“balance between the rock and the hard
place”.  Make many assumptions discussed
more later, such as:
• emissions need to be cut
• market mechanisms will be used
• no time dimension; so what follows includes
many dynamic schemes, e.g. initially free
permits which are then phased out
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Why are no free permits better for the economy?
• Because of tax interaction (TI).  Raising $1 of revenue
from existing (labour) income tax & other taxes has extra
“deadweight” (distortionary) cost of $M, mainly
because of reduced labour supply.  M > 0.3?
• Hence $1 revenue from market mechanism allows
“revenue-recycling benefit” of at least 30c, e.g. by
reducing income tax rate; hence economists’ “hard place”
recommendation to sell all permits.
Why are no free permits fairer than all free permits?
• Because emissions control may reduce output, raise
output price and give emitters extra profits.
• Important for GHGs: maybe “equity-neutrality” for firms
needs only 10-30% of permits to be free – deserves
wider publicity to shift political reality.
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With a tax instead
of permits, much
(but not all) of the
same analysis
applies...Exempting controlled
emissions from tax is
never considered!
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What might an emission tax threshold “look” like?
Anyland Government
The Treasury
EMISSION TAX THRESHOLD
for 5,000 tonnes/year of CO2-equivalent
The Anyland Government will pay the bearer, on 1 July
each year forever, a sum equal to 5,000 tonnes/year,
multiplied by the CO2 tax rate in $/tonne set for that
year by the Anyland Environmental Protection Agency
If this threshold idea is vital to make a tax
acceptable, but is widely ignored, why bother with a
tax at all?
• Permits control emissions quantity but leave price
uncertain.   A tax controls emissions price but leaves
quantity uncertain.
• If society suffers more from price uncertainty cost to
emitters than from quantity uncertainty cost to environment,
a tax is better than permits (Weitzman 1974)
• With CO2, one year’s emission quantity has negligible
effect on environment, because of huge concentration
already in atmosphere; so quantity uncertainty not v. costly.
• So with CO2, tax has considerable economic advantage
(Pizer 2002, and promoted by McKibbin 2005 and earlier)
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How big can this welfare gain from thresholds be?
     Example: deadweight factor M = 0.3: constraint that total cost to
emitters can be max. 20% of uncontrolled environmental damage DE0
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Evidence for political constraint on revenue-raising
• The CIA doesn’t like pure emission taxes...
…since 1972, the (UK) Chemical Industries Association
argues that since residual pollution (allowed by
regulation) is “socially acceptable”, it should not be
charged for.
• 1990 US tradable permits for SO2 : 97% given out free
• History of European CO2 control policy, 1990s - date:
– early 1990s, pure tax + full revenue-recycling proposed;
thresholds idea ignored
– lobbying against pure tax + lack of EC power to tax forced
change to tradable permits, which “can” be given free
– hence permits used in 1997 Kyoto Protocol and 2005 EU
Emission Trading Scheme; in latter many will be given free
NZ carbon tax provides further ongoing evidence….
   …but first, do simplifying assumptions above fit the
CO2 case?
(1) Sizeable cuts in emissions are needed [assumed] - will
not debate here, but CO2 already higher than in last
650,000 years and rising 200x faster...
(2) Alternative policies to market mechanisms? [ignored]
  (a) direct regulation (e.g. no new coal-fired power
stations, mandated fuel efficiency standards for new
vehicles)
  (b) technology subsidies (e.g. for domestic solar panels,
geosequestration of CO2)
  (c) information (persuasion, exhortation)
On their own, these alternative policies are either:
• inefficient: direct regulation and technology subsidies give
very unequal unit ($/tn) control costs, hence much higher
total costs.  Market mechanisms give equal unit costs
(saved 25-35% for US SO2 control, see Hahn 2000)
    and/or
• ineffective: technology subsidies and information fail to
get price message to emitters like you and me commuting
long distances in 4WDs, flying round the world and living in
big air-conditioned houses
However, combined with market mechanisms, above policies
may be very important: even with big emission price,
market failures are widespread; and politically smart to
spend some permit/tax revenue on direct measures?
(3) International competition [ignored]
• Can free permits or thresholds protect trade-
sensitive, carbon-intensive industries against unfair
competition from uncontrolled countries?
    It depends:
• If political resistance from such industries (which are
often exempted from control - the very emitters that
should be controlled!) can be bought off by transfer of
wealth, then Yes.
• If political resistance stems from loss of employment
and output needed to reduce emissions then No – no
easy answer to latter (hence pressure for technological
fixes).
(4) The time dimension [ignored]
• Emissions control last for many years.
• So govt can create permanent permits/thresholds (in
tonnes/year, as above), or temporary ones (in tonnes).
• Hence many schemes for phasing out free
permits/thresholds over time, or using mix of free
permanent ones and auctioned temporary ones, etc, etc.
• Such schemes important psychologically: worth using.
• However, for all of them, discounted value of free
permits can be calculated as % of discounted value of all
permits - and that is my E†/E ratio above.   So phasing etc.
schemes fall within my overall idea.
(5) Another time dimension [ignored]
• Because of adjustment costs, short-run control costs
much higher than long-run.
• So don’t jump to “optimum”, but phase in emission
price -  distinct from phasing out free permits, which
do nothing to lower cost of actual control
(6) Spatial variation [ignored]
• Emissions may have different environmental impacts,
depending where they come from
• Hence analysis gets even more complex for spatial
pollutants, e.g. emitted at different points along a river
(7) (a) Emissions hard to monitor because millions of
emitters, and (b) market has many levels (oil→petrol
→transport, coal→electricity→aluminium, etc)  [ignored]
– Because of monitoring, emitters not necess.
acquitters (to save cost, latter are primary fuel
extracters and importers);
– Emitters may or may not be able to pass carbon price
up- or down-level in market (compare private motorist
with coal-fired power station)
– So who are net losers from carbon pricing is
economically very complex, and which deserve free
permits/thresholds is politically contentious – may
well not include foreign firms!
Further questions about market control of CO2
• Wouldn’t no free permits or thresholds save a great
deal in rent-seeking costs?  Yes…but maybe resistance
to pure mechanisms generates just as much rent-seeking?
• Emission pricing unfair to poor consumers?  Yes,
because poor spend more proportionally on carbon-
intensive products – but both free permits/thresholds and
permit/tax revenue can and should be used to redress this.
• Morally repugnant to price the environment?  It’s sad,
but alternatives of draconian or ineffective controls worse.
• Green consumerism an answer?  Take-up of voluntary
CO2-saving schemes (mainly electricity) is tiny, and why
should only those who care pay, when all enjoy or suffer
the same climate?
The New Zealand carbon tax
• May 2005: govt. said carbon tax (fully recycled, but with
no thresholds) will start 1 Apr 2007 at NZ$15/tCO2
• Tax rate may be revised, as aimed at international price of
CO2, but capped at NZ$25/t.
• Tax will apply to emissions from energy supply and use;
process emissions; and fugitive energy emissions.
• Agricultural methane and nitrous oxide, and methane from
the waste sector, not taxed.
• Firms can get full or partial exemption from the tax by
“moving to world's best practice in emissions control”&
signing a Negotiated Greenhouse Agreement,, aimed to
prevent production moving (“leaking”) from NZ to countries
with less stringent climate change policies.
The New Zealand carbon tax (contd.)
• June 2005: new forecasts predict NZ 36 Mt above Kyoto
Protocol target.  When Govt agreed to ratify the K.P. and
introduce carbon tax, 50 Mt below was expected.
    In-depth review will be conducted, and sent to Cabinet by
31 Oct 2005, on current climate policy.
• August 2005 (election campaign), Federated Farmers:
“…scrap the pointless carbon tax…which will increase
costs for farms, businesses and consumers.  It will damage
NZ’s international competitiveness and have no discernible
impact on greenhouse gas emissions or climate change.”
• November 2005: Revenue Minister Peter Dunne: “It is
highly unlikely a carbon tax will come into force on the
scheduled date of April 1, 2007”.  Labour Govt is kept in
office by Dunne's United Future Party and NZ First Party...
Conclusions / recommendations
• In distributing tradable emission permits: avoid divide
between all free permits and no free permits.  Explore
options between – for % of free permits, and for who
gets them (not necess. emitters or acquitters).
• In debating emission tax: avoid extreme of pure tax
(even if revenue recycled).  Consider partial exemption
with thresholds, distributed like free permits would be.
• Hence make acceptable the tighter, cheaper control of
CO2 emissions by rich countries that permits and taxes
offer.  Under uncertainty, a tax could be much cheaper.
• No panacea.  Many variants exist (especially over time);
best solutions complex; combine with other policy
instruments; not all problems, esp. international trade
competition, are helped.
THE END
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